Cyber security measures -How to protect the nation\u27s critical infrastructurefrom cyber attacks by 山田 肇 & Science & Technology Foresight Center
32
S C I E N C E  &  T E C H N O L O G Y  T R E N D S
4
Cyber Security Measures
— How to protect the nation's critical infrastructure from cyber attacks —
TOMOE KIYOSADA, Information and Communications Research Unit
HAJIME YAMADA, Affiliated fellow
4.1 Introduction
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
targeting the U.S., have driven not only the
country but also the world into turmoil.Terrorism
carried out by only a few tens of people caused a
major disaster involving thousands of casualties,
which resulted in chaos in the city for several
days.
Under U.S.-lead retaliatory strikes, the possibility
of further counter-attacks by terrorists is posing a
greater threat to us.What type of measures would
they take? What can our government do to
prevent damage?
By focusing on cyber terrorism, this report
provides information on how the U.S. has been
developing cyber security policies from an early
stage, which will contribute to our policymaking
to improve cyber security.
4.2 Cyber Attack Threat
4.2.1  Will there be further retaliatory attacks?
On October 11, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) officially warned that there was
a probability of additional terrorist attacks within
a few days ("Immediate Release," FBI National
Press Office). The Washington Post also reported
on October 5 that officials from the FBI, CIA
(Central Intelligence Agency) and DIA (Defense
Intelligence Agency) unofficially stated to the
members of the Senate and House Intelligence
Committees, "there is a 100 percent chance of an
attack should the United States strike Afghanistan."
("FBI, CIA warn Congress of more attacks as Blair
details case against Bin Laden," Washington Post.)
4.2.2  Further retaliation through cyber attacks
Assuming terrorists are planning retaliations, what
measures would they take? Taking their
presumably scarce resources into account, they
are likely to use biological, chemical or cyber
weapons, which can be developed and executed
with limited labor and cost, instead of missiles for
armed attacks.
Actually, in the U.S., anthrax infected patients
turned up one after another, increasing the threat
of bio-terrorism. However, as security against
terrorism becomes extremely tight throughout the
country, cyber attacks, which can be carried out
from a remote place, are no less serious a threat
than bio-attacks. In fact, Infrastructure Defense
(iDEFENSE), an information provider dedicated to
cyber security, pointed out that supporters of
either terrorism or anti-terrorism have already
organized hacker groups, through which cyber
attacks have started against targeted Web sites
such as those operated by U.S. corporations or by
Islamic nations (iDEFENSE Report #105540,
#105551).
4.2.3  Terrorists' capability of cyber attacks
Next, how terrorists are capable of cyber attacks is
discussed.
It is reported that Bin Laden is likely to have been
secretly sending instructions for attacks by using a
technology known as steganography ("Terror
groups hide behind Web encryption," February 6,
2001, USA TODAY).
Steganography is the technique of embedding
secret messages, images, or data in ordinary file
formats sent over or displayed on the Internet
such as texts, images, and audio. Professor
Johnson, George Mason University shows on his
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Web site (http://www.jjtc.com/stegdoc/sec313.
html) the comparison of an image with data
embedded by using steganography and the same
image without the hidden data. There is virtually
no visible difference between the two. Secret
information is typically sent by using an
encryption technique, and thus it is clearly known
something is hidden within the encrypted data.
On the other hand, steganography does not allow
others to readily recognize if there is masked
information or not, thus enhancing confidentiality.
In addition, while encrypted data is often detected
by data traffic interception systems online, this is
not likely to occur with steganographic data.
Dr. Hunker, who led the cyber security division of
the National Security Council (NSC) under the
Clinton administration, pointed out that the
September 11 attacks must have been well-
prepared by well-educated people probably with
abundant financial resources. He also said if these
people had carried out a cyber attack, the result
would have caused as great damage to the U.S.
("U.S. Networks Run Big Risk of Cyber-strikes,"
Experts Assert, October 3, 2001, Mercury News.)
The above chapter showed an analysis of; i) Cyber
attack threat, and ii) Terrorists' capability of cyber
attacks. With attention to how the U.S. developed
their cyber security policies from an early stage,
the following chapters outline the policies as well
as the background that made the country address
this field.
4.3 Enhanced Cyber Security
Awareness in the U.S.
Development of information technology (IT)
facilitated the connection of the critical
infrastructure of defense, electricity, natural gas,
telephone networks, and transportation to the
Internet. While improving convenience, this has
increased the vulnerability of these systems.
Meanwhile, there has been a growing number of
unauthorized entries into key infrastructure
systems in the U.S. over the past few years
("Emerging Challenge: Security and Safety in
Cyberspace," Ver. 14, No. 4,Winter 1995-1996, IEEE
Technology and Society Magazine). Thus, cyber
strikes on critical infrastructure are being
recognized as a new national security threat.
4.3.1  Exercises assuming cyber attacks
On March 23, 1996, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the
Department of Defense (DOD) conducted an
exercise called "The Day After...," assuming a
variety of damage that could be caused by a cyber
attack targeting key infrastructure (Strategic
information warfare: a new face of war," Roger C.
Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson,
Rand Corporation). The cyber strike scenario
developed for the exercise is described in Table 1.
Now that a terror attack beyond our imagination
occurred, the cyber strikes described in the above
scenario sound more realistic. The following
section outlines an experiment conducted to
examine the feasibility of such cyber attacks.
4.3.2  Computer system vulnerability study
In June 1997, DOD conducted an experiment
called "Eligible Receiver" to examine the
vulnerability of DOD key infrastructure, such as
networks, communications systems, and the
power grid, against cyber attacks (Testimony by
Mr. Richard C. Schaeffer, Jr., October 6, 1999,
Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Technology, Terrorism and Government
Information). For this experimental exercise, 30
officials at national security organizations acted as
hackers with the following mission.
— Shutting down the control systems for key
infrastructure such as communications
networks and the power grid.
— Entering DOD computer networks without
authorization.
The participants were also told; i) while simulating
an attack on key infrastructure, they should leave a
sigh in the system they penetrated, instead of
actually shutting down the system, and ii) with
respect to the unauthorized access experiment,
they should clearly indicate how deep they
penetrated.
The acting hackers followed these terms:
— Do not use knowledge obtained through
their jobs.
— Buy and use any computers available off the
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Table 1: Cyber strike scenario
Date and Time
Proceedings(EDT)
Evening, May 11 NCC reports to the White House that; (1) the public telephone network system for
Northern California and Oregon suffered a failure due to a Trojan horse, and (2) the base
phone system for Fort Lewis had been subjected to a DoS attack and their
communications system had been paralyzed for several hours.
Later at night, May 11 In Cairo, Egypt, the electricity supply system failed, leaving 90% of the nation's
households without power for several hours.
4:00, May 13 A large oil refinery in Southeast Sandi Arabia suffered a control system failure, causing
an explosion and fire.
18:12, May 14 In Maryland, a logic bomb embedded in the transportation system network exploded,
causing a collision between a freight train and a high-speed train. Maryland State Police
estimate 60 dead and 120 injured.
6:00, May 16 Scotland Yard reports to the British Prime Minister that the Bank of England detected
three failures in their funds transfer system and the Bank leaders, considering this
serious, suspended the funds transfer service.
Morning, May 20 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) information warfare planning cell announced that their
computer program for time phased execution control is infected with an unknown worm.
12:10, May 20 The automatic tellers of the two major banks in Georgia started to malfunction causing a
bank run. These banks were forced to shut down their ATM systems.
12:25, May 20 The CNN news center feed out of Atlanta was off the air for 12 minutes.
15:30, May 20 CNN aired a special report focusing on the vulnerability of the U.S. to cyberspace
warfare, dwelling on the series of incidents including; (1) the crash of the express train
linking Boston, New York and Washington D.C., (2) the telephone outage in the
Northwest, (3) the malfunction of the ATM systems in Atlanta, and (4) the
still-unexplained interference with CNN's signal transmission.
Evening, May 20 Local and national evening programs reported that U.S. military deployments to the Gulf
were experiencing delays due to cyber attacks on the LANs and phone systems of key
Army and Marine bases.
19:44, May 22 The pilot of a Continental Airline's Airbus-340 making a final approach to O'Hare
International Airport reported to the control tower that his flight deck avionics had
suffered a malfunction and that the aircraft was out of control.
Night, May 22 After receiving a preliminary British report concluding that all late model AB-330 and 340
flight control software may be infected by a sophisticated logic bomb, the administrator
of the FAA recommended that all late model AB-330s and AB-340s be immediately
grounded until the nature of the flight deck malfunction can be ascertained.
12:57, May 23 The Saudi public switched network began to fail apparently due to unauthorized
modification of the system through trap doors.
16:10, May 23 The Secretary of Defense was informed by the JCS Chief that a full-scale
IW attack by unknown sources was underway at almost every military base in the U.S.
and Europe.
19:00, May 23 Several radar aircraft operating in the Gulf region were plagued with a computer worm.
10:30, May 24 The entire phone network system in the Washington/Baltimore region including local
cellular systems failed due to trap doors.
13:30, May 24 The Chicago Commodity Exchange experienced some of its wildest fluctuations in
history. There was widespread suspicion that the Exchange was being subjected to a
form of electronic manipulation by parties unknown.
Afternoon, May 24 In Washington D.C., an emergency NSC meeting was called by the President but the
arrangement was difficult because of the phone system shutdown.
Notes:
NCC: National Communications Center
Trojan horse: A program set on a computer system that allows the program developer to take control of the system.
Trap door: A technique that permits designated third parties to access a targeted program or network, bypassing
passwords or other security procedures.
Source: "Strategic information warfare: a new face of war," Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddile, and Peter A. Wilson,
Rand Corporation
shelf.
— Carry out an attack over a commercial
Internet service.
— Use hacking tools available and downloadable
from Web sites.
Prior to the exercise, the participants had a three-
month preliminary period. During the exercise,
they gained unauthorized access to key
infrastructure and left signs showing their ability
to turn off the systems. They also successfully
broke into DOD computer networks. There were
40,000 attempts of unauthorized access to the
networks, out of which 36 were successful.
However, it was only two of them that DOD
system administrators could detect. Some hackers
even succeeded in obtaining a system
administrator's authority, which allowed them to
access any desired DOD network.
This experiment showed that as few as 30 people
who do not have any special skills could have
paralyzed critical communications networks and
the power grid, and could have taken control of
DOD networks, which are protected with one of
the most sophisticated security systems in the
world. In other words, it was proven that a small
number of people could cause a national security
crisis in the U.S. The result shook the U.S.
government so violently that the government
officials could not help starting to seriously
address cyber security issues.
4.4 Critical Infrastructure
Protection in the U.S.
The critical infrastructure protection policy the
federal government is now working on is based on
the scheme announced by then- President Clinton
in January 2000, "The National Plan for
Information Systems Protection Version 1.0" ("The
National Plan for Information Systems Protection
Version 1.0," January 2000,The White House).
This plan is often referred to by governments of
other nations, when they formulate their own
cyber security policy.
In this chapter, we will look at how this plan was
developed in the first section 4.4.1, and then
outline the plan in section 4.4.2.
4.4.1  How the National Plan for Information
Systems Protection Version 1.0 was
developed
In response to the result of the Eligible Receiver
exercise, an intrusion detection device was
installed on every DOD network in addition to 24-
hour monitoring. Other government agencies also
began to take cyber security measures.
On the other hand, the industry was not paying as
much attention as the government to their critical
infrastructure protection.
Therefore, the government, which had been
leaving the private sector to take care of their own
key infrastructure protection and provision of
stable service, changed their attitude and decided
to collaborate with them to protect critical
infrastructure according to the series of policies
shown in Table 2.
(1) Recommendations by PCCIP
July 1996, then-President Clinton signed Executive
Order 13010 to initiate:
— Establishment of the President's Commission
on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP)
— Definition of critical infrastructure by the
above organization
— Discussion on protective measures for the
above critical infrastructure
PCCIP designated the following systems, which
are crucial to national security and people's lives,
as critical infrastructure:
— Power supply systems
— Gas/oil production systems
— Financial systems
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Table 2: Recent changes in the U.S. critical
infrastructure protection policy
Month / Year Description
7 / 1996 Then- President Clinton established the
President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP).
10 / 1997 PCCIP released a report.
5 / 1998 Then- President Clinton signed the
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63.
1 / 2000 The National Plan for Information
Systems Protection Version 1.0 was
announced.
— Transportation systems
— Water supply systems
— Emergency care service systems
— Public administration service systems
After studying protective measures for these
systems, PCCIP issued the following
recommendations in October 1997.
— Develop a wide range of programs to
enhance cyber security awareness in the
private sector.
— Facilitate collaboration and information
sharing between the government and the
private sector.
— Review the current legislation to eliminate
elements that may hinder critical
infrastructure protection.
— Promote research and development programs
to develop technologies applicable to critical
infrastructure protection.
— Expand national-level efforts to effectively
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Table 3: The structure to implement PDD 63
Structure Person or organization in charge Responsibility
Assigning a The First National Coordinator was Clarke — Assist the President in implementation of
National (the current chair of the National PDD 63, and in charge of critical
Coordinator Commission onTerrorism) infrastructure protection as well as with
domestic and foreign terrorism.
Establishing — Established within the FBI as a body to — Provide warnings, analyses, and
the National fuse together representatives from DOD, countermeasures in response to cyber
nfrastructure USSS (U.S. Secret Service), DOE (Dept. threats, coordinate the effort of
Protection of Energy), DOT (Dept. of Transportation), concerned organizations, mitigate
Center (NIPC) the intelligence community, and so on, to attacks, and support recovery in the case
promote collaboration among agencies of damage.
and the private sector that are dealing
with computer crimes and infrastructure
protection. 
— Linked via networks with the federal
government's monitoring center, private
information centers and other facilities
dedicated to countering cyber attacks.
Establishing — Established in each critical infrastructure — Report and exchange information about;
Information industry. (1) threats and damage from cyber
Sharing and — The first ISAC, which was founded by the attacks and computer crimes, (2)
Analysis financial industry, started operation in countermeasures and best practices,
Centers (ISACs) October 1999. and (3) system vulnerabilities.
Establishing — The chairperson is designated by the — Meet periodically to enhance the
the National President. partnership of the public and private
Infrastructure — The national coordinator serves as the sectors in protecting our critical
Assurance executive director of the NIAC. infrastructure.
Council (NIAC) — The members of the NIAC are appointed
by the President, based on the
recommendations of the major agencies
and the National Economic Council
(NEC), from private sector entities
representing the critical infrastructure and
from local governments.
Establishing — Organized within the Department of — Provide support to the national
the Critical Commerce. coordinator's work in developing a
Infrastructure national plan for protecting critical
Assurance Office infrastructure.
— Integrate the security measures
developed by critical infrastructure
industries into the national plan.
— Analyze the federal government's
dependence on  critical infrastructure.
— Help coordinate national education and
awareness programs for cyber security,
and legislative affairs.
Source: PDD 63, May 22, 1998, The White House
This was the first time that the government
mentioned the private sector activities related to
critical infrastructure protection.
(2) Presidential Decision Directive 63
In response to the recommendations by PCCIP,
then- President Clinton, following additional
discussions in NSC, signed Presidential Decision
Directive (PDD) 63 in May 1998. The Directive
prescribes:
— To build a reliable, interconnected, and secure
information system infrastructure by the year
2003, and significantly increase security of
government systems by the year 2000.
— To immediately establish a national center to
warn of and respond to cyber attacks.
— To address the cyber and physical
infrastructure vulnerabilities of the federal
government by requiring each department
and agency to work to reduce its exposure to
new threats.
— To require the federal government to serve as
a model to the rest of the country, including
state governments and enterprises, on how
infrastructure protection is to be attained.
— To seek the voluntary participation of private
industries to meet common goals for
protecting our critical systems through
public-private partnerships.
— To protect privacy rights and not to hinder
free competition in the market while
implementing cyber security policies.
— To seek full participation and input from
Congress, in terms of overall cyber security
protection.
In addition, PDD 63 orders the setting up of a
structure as shown in Table 3 to deal with the
challenge.
To implement PDD 63, the following National Plan
for Information Systems Protection Version 1.0
was developed.
4.4.2  Outline of the National Plan for
Information Systems Protection Version
1.0
Based on PDD 63, then- President Clinton set the
National Plan for Information Systems Protection
Version 1.0 in January 2000.
(1) Goals of the National Plan Ver. 1.0
The goals set up for the National Plan Ver. 1.0 are
as shown in Table 4.
(2) Programs for the National Plan Ver. 1.0
To achieve the above goals, the programs shown
in Table 5 were developed for the National Plan
Ver. 1.0.
(3) Government organizations to carry out
the National Plan Ver. 1.0
Figure 1 shows the government organizations that
will carry out the National Plan Ver. 1.0. As
indicated, the government is addressing critical
infrastructure protection from a variety of
viewpoints, including national security, R&D,
standardization of technology and methods,
human resource development, and information
provision and analysis.
(4) Toward Version 2.0
As explained above, the National Plan Ver. 1.0
focuses on critical infrastructure protection
activities initiated by the federal government. The
version number is added because the Plan, which
is now in the initial phase, is supposed to evolve in
the future. The focus of attention toward the
following phase is how private, public and local
organizations are involved and expected to play
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Table 4: Goals of the National Plan Ver. 1.0
Category Outline
Prepare and Prevent — Minimize damage in case of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure.
— Allow the attacked infrastructure to keep functioning without suspension of service.
Detect and respond — Timely isolate, analyze, and confine cyber strikes, so that the affected system can
be quickly restored and reconstructed.
Build strong foundations — Develop a structure, human resources, and legislation, so that national-level
prevention and detection of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure are provided.
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Table 5: Programs to achieve the goals of the National Plan Ver. 1.0
Category Program# Outline
Prepare and prevent 1 Identify critical infrastructure assets and shared interdependencies and
address vulnerabilities
Detect and respond 2 Detect attacks and unauthorized intrusions
3 Develop robust intelligence and law enforcement capabilities to protect
critical information systems, consistent with the law
4 Share attack warnings and information in a timely manner
5 Create capabilities for response, reconstitution, and recovery
Build strong foundations 6 Enhance research and development in support of Programs 1 - 5
7 Train and employ adequate numbers of information security specialists
8 Outreach to make Americans aware of the need for improved
cyber-security
9 Adopt legislation and appropriations in support of Programs 1 - 8
10 In every step and component of the plan, ensure the full protection of
American citizens' civil liberties, their rights to privacy, and their rights
to the protection of proprietary data
Source: The National Plan for Information Systems Protection Version 1.0, January 2000, The White House
Figure 1: Organizations related to critical infrastructure protection policies in the U.S.
certain roles independently or in collaboration
with the government in order to protect their
own critical infrastructure. The Bush
administration is now working on the next version
of the National Plan, which is being developed
based on the previous version by integrating a
wide range of opinions from Congress, state
governments, industries, and local communities as
well as from the public at large.The National Plan
Version 2.0 will be released this fall.
4.5 The U.S. Government 
Budget to Protect Critical
Infrastructure
Figure 2 shows the trend in the U.S. government
budge to protect critical infrastructure.
Figure 2 indicates that the U.S. government budget
to protect critical infrastructure has been on a
steady rise.
4.6 Cyber Protection after the
September 11 Attacks
On October 9, President Bush assigned Richard
Clarke, who is the current chairman of the
National Commission on Terrorism, as the special
advisor to the President on Cyberspace Security.
His mission was; i) immediately create a highly
secured information system, and ii) establish a
system that minimizes damage caused in case of
cyber attacks ("Fact Sheet on New Counter-
Terrorism and CyberSpace Positions," October 9,
2001,The White House).
Immediately after the assignment, Special Advisor
Clarke announced a plan to develop GOVNET, a
network dedicated to government organizations
("Top Cybercop Wants New Net," October 10,
2001,Associated Press).
The House Committee of Science held a public
hearing on cyber security protection on October
10 ("Committee hears sobering news on nation's
cyber security," October 10, 2001, Committee on
Science, US House), where lawmakers, who were
seriously concerned about the threat of cyber
strikes, and invited experts actively discussed what
the U.S. government was expected to do in the
short, medium and long ranges.
Following this, Associate Press reported on
October 11 that the federal government was
planning a cellular system that would allow
priority communications by emergency crews and
government officials during a crisis. According to
the report, the government was going to secure
priority circuits for 500 users in the following two
months and for 50,000 users by the end of 2002
(U.S. Plans New Cellular System," October 11,
2001,Associated Press).
On October 16, President Bush signed an
executive order on critical infrastructure
protection from cyber attacks that demands; i)
continuous protection of critical infrastructure, ii)
development of emergency communication
networks, and iii) establishment of the President's
Critical Infrastructure Protection Board.The Board
is positioned as the highest-level authority to
oversee planning and coordination of efforts to
protect the private sector's critical infrastructure,
public sector's information systems, and critical
information systems for national security.
On the other hand, in Japan, the Cabinet decided
to establish the Emergency Anti-Terrorism
Headquarters, which on the same day, released
emergency measures to combat terrorism. Among
these measures, top priority items were identified
on October 12, one of which was "enhancing the
capability to counter cyber terrorism." More
specifically, it was required to enhance the ability
to counter cyber terrorism through reinforcing
and expanding personnel involved, gathering
information, increasing more sophisticated
detection, analysis, and examination devices,
strengthening protection of critical infrastructure,
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Figure 2: U.S. government budgetary trends (critical
infrastructure protection)
Source: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal
and so on.
Meanwhile, on October 10, the IT Strategy
Headquarters convened the IT Security Promotion
Committee to discuss and formulate a policy to
deal with cyber terror attacks, which emphasized
closer partnerships between the government and
private sector.
4.7 Conclusion
This report provided an overview of the U.S. effort
to develop cyber security policies from an early
stage to address the increasing cyberspace threat.
Ahead of other countries in the world, the U.S.
government has developed the National Plan for
Information Systems Protection Version 1.0.While
establishing a structure to carry out the plan, they
are actively tackling measures in areas such as
R&D, development of human resources,
legislation, privacy protection, and governmental
funding. In particular, their emphasis on
protection of critical infrastructure owned by
private and public sector entities, based on the
awareness that malfunction of these systems can
cause a nation-wide crisis, provides us with a lot of
useful information.
Meanwhile, we should also be aware of the risk
that our cyberspace vulnerabilities can cause
damage not only to our country but also to other
countries. Cyber attackers often make use of third-
party computers to prevent backward tracing. If
an attacker carries out a strike via a computer in
Japan, the victim may take our country as the
home of the criminal.
So far, even the U.S., the country most prepared
for cyber strikes, does not seem to provide perfect
critical infrastructure protection. Besides, as they
often compare it to dog years, information
technology is advancing so rapidly that a newly
developed technology to enable higher security
can soon become obsolete.
Therefore, it is important for us to immediately
strengthen cyber security and to keep our
countermeasures up to date.
From this point of view, we must have been quick
enough when, in the wake of the terrorist attacks
in the U.S., we started taking actions to combat
cyber terrorism, lead by the Emergency Anti-
Terrorism Headquarters and IT Strategy
Headquarters.
The U.S. government is expected to announce the
National Plan for Information Systems Protection
Version 2.0, an upgrade from Version 1.0, in this
fall. While making use of it as a helpful guide, the
Japanese government should develop its own
policy to protect the nation's information systems.
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(Original Japanese version: published in October 2001)
